The Russian Federation’s Policies Toward the Korean Security Crisis: Moscow’s Pivot Toward China
Anthony V. Rinna
Global Politics Review
Vol. 6, no. 1-2 (2020): 6-19.
GPR ID: 2464-9929_v06_i1-2_p006
Received: October 25, 2019. Accepted: February 10, 2020. Published: March 23, 2020.
ABSTRACT: Amidst the fluctuation in the state of diplomacy over Korean security between the threat of “fire and fury” in 2017 and the period of summitry between 2018-2019, the Russian Federation has demonstrated an unprecedented level of cooperation with the People’s Republic of China over the North Korean security crisis. Factors that have led to Moscow’s increasing alignment with Beijing, in spite of potential Russian strategic anxieties over the rise of Chinese power in East Asia, include Russia’s own lack of clout on the Korean Peninsula as well as stark differences in Russian and American views over how to achieve the denuclearization of the DPRK and peace in Korea. Trends toward Beijing-Moscow policy coordination presenting an alternative vision to American policies over Korean security means that while Russia’s own role as an independent actor in Korean security continues to remain negligible, it is appropriate to speak of Moscow’s role as comprising an element of a Sino-Russian bloc in Korean security dynamics and diplomacy.
Keywords: East Asia, Korea, Russia, nuclear program, foreign policy, security.
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